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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper investigates to what extent will the Colombian population be better off when 
goods such as health and education, are delivered locally as against centrally. Health and 
education are quasi-private goods
1, that is goods that have the characteristics of private 
goods, such as excludability and positive marginal costs of supply to an additional 
consumer, but are publicly provided. In this case, public intervention could be justified 
on the grounds of market failure, merit wants, externalities, or distributional arguments 
(Hare, 1988). 
Toward this end, we build a multiregional computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model for Colombia in order to compare two provision scenarios: one in which 
the provision of the quasi-private goods is carried out centrally, against one in which 
provision is carried out regionally. The literature on the provision of private goods by the 
public sector is mainly normative, since it focuses on the characteristics of possible 
provision rules. In this modelling exercise, a provision rule based on the median voter is 
considered. In this framework, the median voter (either national or regional) determines 
the quantity of the publicly provided private good to be allocated to each consumer.  
During the last two decades the assignment of tax and spending powers between 
different levels of government has been receiving increasing attention from economists 
and policymakers alike. The main economic argument in favour of decentralisation is 
that it enhances economic efficiency, since regional governments tend to be better 
informed about local preferences than national governments.
2 
Many developing countries, including the transition economies of Eastern 
Europe, are turning to decentralisation as a way to escape from inefficient central 
governments, macroeconomic instability and inadequate economic growth (Bird, 1993). 
Decentralisation can also be justified on political grounds, especially if a country’s 
population is not homogeneous in terms of ethnic, racial, cultural, linguistic, or other 
relevant characteristics are regionally distributed. In Canada, for example, the move 
                                                 
1 The term quasi-private was taken from Boadway et al (1994). 
2 See Boadway et al (1994) for a presentation of the pros and cons of decentralisation. For recent 
theoretical models of the costs and benefits of decentralisation see Lockwood (1998a, 1998b), and the 
references therein.  
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towards greater decentralisation has been mainly the result of political considerations, as 
some provinces are demanding more independence. In China, greater decentralisation 
has been driven by the need to regain some control over national public revenue. And in 
Ethiopia, ethnic diversity together with the belief that decentralisation would help hold 
national unity have been behind the decentralisation effort (Tanzi, 1995). 
In Colombia the centralist organisation of the government has been evident since 
the Political Constitution of 1886. Political, administrative and fiscal powers as well as 
the provision of public services w 
ere concentrated in the central government, leading to a growing dissatisfaction 
among the regions because of the lack of autonomy and deficiencies in the provision of 
public services. In the early 1980s, a Commission on Intergovernmental Finances 
recommended an increase in the use of local resources for local purposes, which in turn 
resulted in a new legislative framework for decentralising functions and finances 
(Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 1981). The Political Constitution of 1991 
introduced some modifications to the prevailing territorial order of the country and 
redefined the functions of territorial entities, establishing new parameters to assign and 
determine transfers from the central government to lower levels of government. In 1993, 
each level of government was assigned functions in areas such as health, education, 
housing, drinking water and other public service.
3  
Contemporaneously with the decentralisation effort, poverty reduction became an 
important issue in Colombia. Poverty alleviation programs have been typically planned, 
executed and controlled by the central government. They are conceived as a multi-
sectoral effort touching health, education, water, sanitation, utilities, family welfare, 
rural development and housing (World Bank, 1994). Given the observed decline in rural 
incomes and the prevailing level of violence in the country, the new strategy to improve 
the standard of living of the population was primarily based on the provision of essential 
                                                                                                                                                
 
3 At the same time, a major change regarding the way transfers were allocated was introduced. Under the 
new regulations central government transfers were no longer allocated according to the population of each 
territorial entity, but based on unsatisfied basic needs, fiscal effort, administrative efficiency and, in some 
cases, in proportion to the potential population to be covered by health and education services. Also, the 
new regulations unified the source of the transfers so that they are now a growing percentage of the 
nation’s current income. 
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social services (such as health, education, housing and drinking water), and the 
generation of employment opportunities by shifting public expenditures towards social 
sectors. Decentralisation and poverty reduction were then brought closer together with 
the introduction of the Law on local government functions and financing in 1993, which 
gave regional governments the responsibility of delivering social programmes and 
services to the poor.
4  
The main contribution of this paper relies on the fact that neither multiregional 
CGE models nor a scheme for public provision of private goods based on the median 
voter, have been previously applied to quantify the magnitude of the efficiency gains 
associated with decentralisation. This paper develops an equilibrium structure in which 
the quantities of the quasi-private goods to be provided by the government, together with 
the taxes levied to finance their provision are endogenously determined. In addition, the 
provision of the quasi-private goods affects the production structure of the economy, 
since in some regions more (less) of the good is produced, so that factors of production 
reallocate both within and between regions. Hence, the multiregional CGE modelling 
approach constitutes an appropriate tool for this analysis, since it allows us to model the 
interrelationships between different regions.  
According to the results which follow, the Colombian population as a whole is 
likely to be better off when the provision of health and education is carried out regionally 
as opposed to centrally, since with regional provision each consumer group is allocated 
an amount of the goods that is closer to its preferences. More importantly, these welfare 
gains vary between 1.3% and 2.3% of GDP approximately, a substantial magnitude 
especially when compared with the efficiency gains associated to the tax reforms of the 
early nineties.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review 
regarding the public provision of quasi-private goods, and the provision rule used in the 
paper. Section 3 describes the structure of the multiregional CGE model. Section 4 
presents the quantification of the efficiency gains from decentralised provision of health 
and education in Colombia. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
                                                 
4 See Garay (1994) and Fainboim et al (1994) for a description of the decentralisation process in 
Colombia.   
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2. PUBLIC PROVISION OF QUASI-PRIVATE GOODS: A BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature concerning the provision of private goods by the public sector is scant. 
Since Arrows’(1971) public expenditure model, this literature has mainly concentrated 
on the characteristics of possible allocation rules, that is how a private good “should be” 
publicly provided (Blomquist and Christensen, 1994; Hare, 1988; Munro, 1991). This 
literature has also analysed issues such as the introduction of user charges (Besley, 1991; 
Balestrino, 1995), the possibility of private market supplementation of the publicly 
provided private good (Epple and Romano, 1996; Blomquist and Christiansen, 1998), 
and the cost efficiency of in-kind transfers with repeated interaction (Thum and Thum, 
2001). 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, Lecture 16) develop three models of public 
provision of private goods, where government intervention is justified on distributional 
grounds. In particular, they consider private goods that are freely provided to all 
consumers in a specified quantity, and cannot be traded by the individuals. These three 
models produce an optimal allocation which coincides with that obtained under free 
market conditions: that is, in the absence of government intervention, the level of 
provision of private goods for each individual is determined by the market, at the point 
where the marginal rate of substitution over consumption goods equals the marginal rate 
of transformation between these goods. 
Besley and Coate (1991) develop a two-good general equilibrium model which 
shows that universal public provision
5 of private goods, such as health, housing and 
education, can redistribute income from the rich to the poor, even if the provision is 
financed through a head tax. Besley and Coate’s model is a discrete choice model where 
individuals demand at most one unit of the good, and their decision as to whether to 
consume the good in the public or private sectors is based on quality considerations. 
These authors assume that the government provides a fixed quality level of the good (at 
zero price), which is typically not too high, and that the public provision is financed 
                                                                                                                                                
 
5 Universal provision means that everybody is eligible and provision is free. 
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through a head tax. Under these circumstances, individuals with higher incomes may 
decide to pay for the good supplied by the private sector which offers a better quality 
level, rather than consuming the good provided by the government. The benefits from 
public provision will be mainly enjoyed by individuals with lower incomes. Nonetheless, 
the authors also find that universal provision schemes of private goods involve a dead-
weight loss for the society as a whole. Besley and Coate’s provision rule does not state 
how the fixed quality level and the head tax are determined. 
  The literature surveyed tells us the general features of possible provision rules in 
a normative sense. In practice, however, the government has to rely on surveys or other 
sources of information to infer the preferences of the population. The provision rule 
could be the result of a voting process. Since all consumers can benefit from the 
provision of the goods and services, the evident rule would be unanimous consent; 
however, it will take a long time to achieve unanimous consent and it encourages 
strategic behaviour (Mueller, 1989). In democratic societies, the majority rule is 
commonly chosen to make collective decisions. This rule introduces some redistribution, 
since some individuals are going to be worse off than they would be if the other outcome 
had been chosen. The possibility of distributional gains also creates an incentive to form 
coalitions. Under the majority rule an equilibrium outcome is obtained when voter’s 
preferences are single-peaked. If these preferences can be depicted along a single 
dimension, as with an expenditure issue, the equilibrium lies at the peak-preference for 
the median voter (Mueller, 1989). It then follows that the median voter rule can be an 
alternative provision rule, where the demand for the good being provided by the 
government is determined by the median voter income. In order to apply the model 
empirically it is necessary to assume that the quantity of the good being provided is that 
demanded by the consumer with the median income (see Inman, 1978). 
In the modelling approach used in this paper, the quantity of the quasi-private 
good provided by the government is determined by the median voter provision rule. As 
Oates (1993) puts it, in the median voter framework the equilibrium level of local 
services is faithfully mirrored by the median of the preferred levels of outputs of local 
residents. That is, under decentralised provision, each regional government will 
determine the provision level of the quasi-private good according to the corresponding  
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demand of the median voter. As one would expect, some individuals will be consuming 
more (or less) than they would have done being the good privately supplied. The public 
provision of the quasi-private good is financed by taxes, which results in transfers from 
consumers with high incomes to consumers with low incomes. Finally, the provision 
rule and the tax regime used to finance the provision of the good must be considered 
jointly, because of the distributional effects they have on the population. 
In what follows, we describe the structure of the multiregional CGE model used to 
assess the welfare effects of the decentralised provision of quasi-private goods by the 
government. 
 
3.  THE MODEL 
We use a CGE model to capture the welfare gains associated with the regional public 
provision of quasi-private goods, as compared to central provision. In this model the 
national economy is disaggregated into regions, since we are interested in the 
distributional effects among them. In addition, more than one consumer group is 
considered, since there are also distributional effects among consumers. 
The model is for a closed economy consisting of R regions, each one with 
demand and production structures. Each region produces two types of goods: those that 
are provided by the public sector, and are thus referred to as the publicly provided quasi-
private goods (henceforth PPQP); and those that are allocated by the market according to 
supply and demand conditions, and are thus referred to as the private goods (henceforth 
PRI). In the model, the PPQP goods are considered to be non-tradable across regions, 
whereas the PRI goods are considered to be qualitatively the same as those PRI goods 
produced by other regions. There are two factors of production, namely labour and 
capital; for simplicity, intermediate production is not considered. Each region has three 
groups of consumers and its own local government. There is also a national government. 
The formal equations and notation used in the model are presented in Appendix 1. 
  In the model, a standard production structure is used, where each region produces 
two PPQP goods and three PRI goods. Constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
production functions describe the substitutability between labour (L) and capital (K) in  
  7
the production of value added for each PRI good in each region. Each industry in each 
region selects an optimal level of inputs that minimises the cost of producing the goods. 
Regarding the PPQP goods, their production involves only labour. 
Factors of production are non-produced commodities in fixed supply in each 
region. It is assumed that both factors are mobile across industries within each region. 
Regarding interregional factor mobility, labour is assumed to be inter-regionally 
immobile since the analysis focuses on the interregional distributional effects of policy 
changes. The analysis excludes all the efficiency issues associated with regional labour 
movements. Capital is assumed to be inter-regionally mobile.  
Turning to the demand side of the model, each region has three groups of 
consumers. These can be thought of as low, medium, and high-income groups, since we 
are interested in the distributional effects of the decentralised provision of the PPQP 
goods within each region. Consumers differ in their preferences for both PPQP and PRI 
goods, and this is the key element to obtain gains from decentralisation.  
As mentioned earlier, in this modelling exercise the quantity of the PPQP goods 
to be publicly provided (either nationally or regionally) is determined by the median 
voter. Thus, the median voter (in the country or in each region, depending on which 
provision scenario is being considered) determines his/her optimal consumption bundle 
by maximising his utility function subject to his budget constraint. In particular, the 
median voter’s behaviour is summarised by means of a CES utility function defined over 
PRI and PPQP goods, more formally,  
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i , M X  is the demand of the median voter for the PRI good i, 
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demand of the median voter for the PPQP good j, and 
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M µ  is the elasticity of substitution 
in consumption between PRI and PPQP goods. 
  The median voter’s budget constraint is in turn given by income equal 
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consumer’s expenditure includes the amount spent on both PRI and PPQP goods as well 
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whether the provision is financed by national or regional taxes, respectively; in either 
case the tax rates t and t
r are endogenously determined. The median voter will take into 
account the cost to him of the provision as well as the taxes levied to finance such 
provision. Hence, both the quantity demanded of the PPQP goods and the tax rate(s) will 
be determined simultaneously.  
The government takes the optimal quantities of the PPQP goods that result from 
the utility maximisation problem of the median voter to allocate to the other consumers. 
Other consumer groups (in the country or in the region) will in turn determine their 
optimal consumption bundle by maximising their utility functions subject to i) their 
budget constraints and ii) the exogenously determined quantities of the publicly provided 
quasi-private goods.  
Regarding the public sector, it is assumed that neither the central government nor 
the regional governments are optimising agents. The government, either national or 




), which could be zero. This 
provision price is a percentage (φ
r) of the cost covering price (
r
PPQPj P ), which implies that 
the government in charge of the provision, has to cover the difference between these 
prices. In order to do this, a uniform income tax (either national or regional) is 
introduced, which is endogenously determined and must be such that the zero 
government surplus condition is satisfied (that is income equals expenditure, IG=EG). In 
addition, a third financing alternative is considered which involves a combination of  
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national and regional taxes: the former is exogenously determined at a level of 0.05%
6 
whereas the latter are endogenously determined. In this case, the revenues generated by 
the national tax are transferred to regional governments. 
Central government income is given by the revenues generated by the provision 
of the PPQP goods and tax revenues. On the other hand, government expenditure is 
given by the cost of provision of the PPQP goods and transfers to regional governments 
(TR
r). Since government income must equal government expenditure, the national tax 
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If the provision of the PPQP goods is financed by regional taxes, the regional tax 
rate can be determined by equalising government income (i.e. the revenues generated by 
the provision of the PPQP goods, tax revenues and central government transfers) and 
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Once the model has been specified, it can be solved for an equilibrium solution. A 
general equilibrium in the model can be interpreted in the usual Walrasian sense as a set 
of prices for which all markets clear. In equilibrium, demand-supply equalities hold in 
each goods and factors markets; zero profit conditions hold for each industry, in each 
region; and, budget balance conditions must be satisfied for the central government and 
regional governments alike, and also for consumers in each region.  
 
4.  QUANTIFYING THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF DECENTRALISATION IN COLOMBIA 
Colombia, like many other countries, has engaged in a rather ambitious process of state 
decentralisation.
7 This process has followed the reforms carried out between 1988 and 
                                                 
6 This value was arbitrarily chosen so as to avoid numerical problems when solving the model.  
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1992 by the Colombian government in order to modernise the economy, which included 
areas such as foreign trade, foreign exchange regime, fiscal legislation, the financial 
sector and the labour market.
8 
Using data for 1992
9, in this section a multiregional CGE model for the 
Colombian economy is built in order to quantify the welfare effects of the decentralised 
provision of quasi-private goods by the government. We will be dealing with a 
simplified version of the Colombian economy, in the sense that aspects such as foreign 
trade are not considered. 
 
4.1 BENCHMARK DATA SET, CALIBRATION AND ELASTICITIES  
Colombia comprises 33 provinces (or administrative regions). The complexities of a 
model with 33 regions are of secondary relevance to the problem being studied, so that 
these provinces were grouped according to the geographical classification of the country. 
Colombia is divided in five so-called “natural” or geographic regions: Pacific, Atlantic, 
Andean, Amazonia, and Orinoquia. Due to data constraints, Amazonia and Orinoquia 
are considered as one region. Hence, there are four regions of different size. The Andean 
region accounts for 63% of the country’s GDP, the Pacific and Atlantic regions each 
accounts for 15% of GDP, and the Amazonia and Orinoquia (henceforth A&O) region 
accounts for the remaining 7% of GDP.
10 
Turning to the commodities in the model, each region is assumed to produce 
three PRI goods and two PPQP goods. The former includes primary commodities 
(including fuels), manufactured goods, and services, whereas the latter corresponds to 
health and education. It is assumed that each region’s PRI goods are qualitatively the 
                                                                                                                                                
7 In the country there have been two national commissions to study decentralisation: Departamento 
Nacional de Planeación (1981) and Wiesner (1992). 
8 See Urrutia(1994) for a presentation of these reforms. 
9 This year was chosen because the decentralisation process in Colombia was just beginning. 
 
10 To assess the sensitivity of the results to the regional classification, the country was also divided into 
three regions according to the GDP of each province. Administrative regions with the lowest GDP were 
grouped in region one, those with medium GDP were grouped in region two, and those with the highest 
GDP are in region three. In addition to the geographic and GDP classifications, provinces were classified 
in five regions according to agricultural GDP, with the provinces with the lowest agricultural GDP 
grouped in region one, and those with the highest in region five. The results under these alternative 
regional classifications are qualitatively the same, and so are not reported.  
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same. It should be mentioned that in Colombia the majority of education and health 
services are provided by the private sector. However, from the available data it is only 
possible to determine the value of the education and health services provided by the 
government (i.e. 0.4% and 2.3% of GDP, respectively), but not by the private sector. For 
this reason, the existence of pure private provision of education and health is not 
considered in the analysis.  
The benchmark data set involves information on value added by component by 
industry, and domestic consumption. It was constructed using data from Regional 
Accounts, as compiled by DANE (1995b), and following the methodology presented by 
St-Hilaire and Whalley (1987). In this methodology, each region is treated as a separate 
economy, in which production and demand transactions by commodity at the regional 
level are presented. The data set also includes transactions between regions (e.g. 
commodity trade), payments of taxes by region as well as government expenditure. The 
equilibrium conditions that characterise the model are present in the data set, that is the 
value of final demands for each good in each region must equal the value of net supply 
(i.e., excluding intermediate supply), each consumer group satisfies its budget constraint, 
and budget balance conditions must be satisfied for the central government and regional 
governments alike.
11  
At this point, it is important to mention that in the Colombian data set, the PPQP 
goods are provided according to the preferences of each consumer group, with each one 
of them demanding different quantities of the goods. This seems inconsistent with the 
fact that the observed data is based on a period in which the PPQP goods were delivered 
by the central government. It would be ideal to allow the benchmark data set to represent 
the scenario in which the PPQP are delivered by the central government. However, there 
are problems with this approximation, since there is not information available to explain 
the differences between the levels of provision between consumer groups and between 
regions. The benchmark data set (Table A2.1 in Appendix 2) is therefore used as a 
starting point to calculate the quantities of the PPQP goods provided by central and 
regional governments.  
                                                 
11 An appendix with the sources and the procedure followed to assemble the data set is available from the 
author upon request.  
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Once the data set has been assembled, some parameter values, such as share 
parameters and scale parameters, can be directly calculated from the equilibrium 
conditions of the model, following the procedure described in Mansur and Whalley 
(1984). This procedure is known as calibration, and can be understood as the ability of 
the model to reproduce base year data as a model solution. The benchmark data set 
provides information on equilibrium transactions in value terms. The first step of the 
calibration procedure involves the separation of these transactions into price and quantity 
observations. In order to do this, a unit convention is widely used, in which it is assumed 
that a physical unit of each good and factor is the amount that sells for one currency unit 
(in this case, one Colombian peso). That is, both goods and factors have a price of unity 
in the benchmark equilibrium. 
The next step in the calibration procedure is to calculate parameters for 
production functions from the benchmark equilibrium observations, given the required 
values of pre-specified elasticities. As CES functional forms are used, substitution 
elasticities must be exogenously determined. On the demand side, the model involves 
elasticities of substitution in consumption between PRI and PPQP goods. In this case, it 
was not possible to find econometric estimates, then this elasticity was set equal to one 
in all regions; these elasticities imply Cobb-Douglas demand functions. Regarding the 
supply side, the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is the key parameter 
of the value-added functions of the PRI goods. These elasticities were calculated as 
weighted averages of the elasticities presented in Whalley (1985, p. 100). This elasticity 
is not required in the production of the PPQP goods, since their production only involves 
labour. 
Once these parameters have been specified, share parameters can be obtained 
from demand functions. On the supply side, share and scale parameters can be obtained 
from cost functions. These parameters allow us to reproduce the data set as an 
equilibrium solution of the model. Then, we compare counterfactual equilibria with the 
benchmark equilibrium generated by the data. The model was solved using a routine we 
wrote in the General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) software.  
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4.2 MODEL RESULTS 
In this section, counterfactual experiments are performed in order to analyse the welfare 
effects of the decentralised provision of PPQP goods, as measured by the equivalent 
variation (EV)
12. In the applied general equilibrium literature, welfare measures focus on 
comparisons between equilibria.  
In the analysis that follows, two provision scenarios are compared: national 
versus regional. In other words, we move from the scenario in which the provision is 
carried out by the central government to that in which PPQP goods are delivered by 
regional governments. 
  In the national provision scenario, uniform quantities of the PPQP goods are 
provided to all consumer groups across the country. These quantities correspond to the 
optimal demands derived from the utility maximisation problem of the median voter of 
the country. In the regional provision scenario, uniform quantities of the PPQP goods are 
provided to all consumers in each region, and these quantities correspond to the optimal 
demands obtained from the utility maximisation problems of the median voters in each 
region. It is important to bear in mind that since secondary data are used, it is likely that 
the share parameters in the utility functions are not the best. Then, it is assumed that the 
information contained in the benchmark data set reflect consumers preferences. 
Since it is assumed that consumers pay a fraction of the cost of the PPQP goods, 
the government finances the remaining part for which three financing alternatives are 
considered: a) a national income tax; b) two regional income taxes; and c) a combination 
of a national tax and two regional taxes. Counterfactual experiments were carried out for 
the cases where the government finances 20%, 50%, 70%, and 100% of the cost of 
provision of the goods, although for brevity we shall focus on the case where consumers 
pay 50%. The new tax rate(s) is(are) endogenously determined and must be such that the 
zero government budget surplus condition is satisfied. Tax rates are calculated using 
equation [3] when provision is financed by a national tax, or [4] when using regional 
taxation. 
                                                 
12 The EV is the minimum amount that someone who gains from a particular change would be willing to 
accept to forego the change. In the case of an individual who loses from the change, the EV is the 
maximum he would be willing to pay to prevent that change. 
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Tax rates are expected to be larger as the percentage of the cost of provision of 
the PPQP goods paid by consumers gets smaller, because the government has to cover 
larger subsidies. In addition, the fact that consumers pay only a fraction of the cost of 
provision of the PPQP goods and that the government finances the remaining part, 
means that some consumer groups pay less than they should pay, whereas other groups 
pay more. 
When uniform quantities of the PPQP goods are provided to all consumer groups 
across the country, consumers are allocated the optimal quantities demanded by 
consumer group two in the Atlantic region (the median voter of the country).
13 When the 
provision takes into account regional differences, uniform quantities of the PPQP goods 
are allocated to all consumers in each region corresponding to the optimal quantities 
demanded by the median voter of each region, in this case consumer group two 
(Appendix 3 presents the quantities allocated to each consumer group in both provision 
scenarios). 
It is important to mention that when the provision, either national or regional, is 
financed by a national tax, the quantity demanded by the median voter increases as the 
percentage of the cost of provision paid by the consumer reduces, since the cost of the 
provision is covered by all consumers in the country. By contrast, when the provision is 
financed by regional taxes or a combination of regional and national taxes, the quantity 
demanded by the median voter reduces as the percentage of the cost of provision paid by 
the consumer increases, since the cost of the provision is now covered only by the 
consumers in the region.  
Table 1 presents the subsidies received by consumers when they pay 50% of the 
cost of provision, under the three financing alternatives
14. This table shows that when 
provision is carried out nationally, consumers in the Andean region are subsidising the 
provision of health and education for the rest of the country (i.e. there is redistribution 
                                                 
13 In strict sense, the median quantity would correspond to the average of the resulting quantities of the 
utility maximisation problem of consumer groups two in the Atlantic and Pacific regions because there is 
an even number of consumers in the country. To simplify the solution of the model, it was decided to 
consider only the results of consumer group two in the Atlantic region.  
 
14 The results when consumers pay 80%, 30%, and 0% of the cost of provision are nor reported here, but 
are available from the author upon request.  
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among regions). The Andean region is the most densely populated region (around 60% 
of the population lives there) and is also the most industrialised one. If, on the other 
hand, provision follows regional preferences, consumer groups two and three in the 
Andean and A&O regions contribute to finance not only the provision of consumer 
group one in their respective region, but also the provision of the poorest consumer 
group in the Pacific and Atlantic regions. In this case there is redistribution within 
regions and among them. 
  When the provision is financed by regional taxes and carried out centrally, taxes 
are higher in the Pacific, Atlantic, and A&O regions than in the Andean region because 
the cost of provision represents a higher proportion of these region’s income. When the 
provision is carried out regionally, tax rates are lower in all regions (compared to 
regional provision financed by a national tax) because smaller quantities of the PPQP 
goods, more in line with consumers’ preferences, need to be financed.  
Regarding subsidies, consumer groups two and three in each region subsidise 
consumer group one in both provision scenarios. In this case there is redistribution 
within the regions. As the percentage paid by consumers for the provision of the good 
falls, subsidies increase since higher taxes are required to balance the budget of the 
government. For example, when consumers pay 50% of the cost of provision, and the 
provision is carried out by the central government, consumer group one in the Pacific 
region receives Col$7.7 billion (see Table 1); when consumers pay 30% and 0%, the 
subsidy increases to Col$10.5 billion and Col$14.3 billion, respectively. 
When the government finances the provision of the PPQP good with a 0.05% 
national tax and regional taxes, tax rates are lower than when only regional taxes are 
used, because the revenues generated by the national tax are transferred back to regional 
governments. It was assumed that 25% of the tax revenues raised by the national tax 
were transferred to each regional government. This percentage can be used as a policy 
instrument in order to redistribute income from the richest to the poorest regions. With 
the transfers the central government helps to cover part of the cost of provision of the 
PPQP goods, so that less regional taxes are needed. In the other financing alternatives 
there are no transfers from the central to regional governments. In this financing 
alternative, under both provision scenarios the two richest consumer groups in the  
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Andean region are not only subsidising consumer group one in that region but also 
helping to finance the provision of consumer group one in the other three regions. In this 
case there is redistribution from the richest region to the poorest, and from the richest 
consumer group to the poorest consumer groups. 
Now, let us consider the welfare effects of the decentralised provision of the 
PPQP goods. Both provision scenarios are compared (i.e., central versus regional) and 
the resulting efficiency gains (losses) are presented in Table 2 for each region and for the 
economy as a whole.
15 As can be seen from the table, whether the provision is financed 
with a national tax, regional taxes, or a combination of a 0.05% national tax and four 
regional taxes, the society as a whole gains from decentralised provision(except when 
the provision is financed by a national tax and the goods are provided free of charge). 
This is the case since under regional provision the quantity of the PPQP good supplied to 
consumers is more in line with their preferences. In addition, the welfare gains vary from 
1.3% to 2.3% of GDP.
16 Notice that when the provision is financed with a national tax, 
the Andean region benefits the most from decentralisation, despite the fact that 
consumers in this region are subsidising the provision of consumers in other regions. As 
the percentage of the cost of provision reduces, the Andean region gains become losses 
since higher taxes are required. The Pacific region is worse off because of reduced 
aggregate consumption. The Atlantic and A&O regions are in some cases worse off; the 
decentralised provision of the PPQP goods increases considerably the quantity allocated 
to these two regions (when the percentage of the cost of provision paid by consumers is 
30% and 0%), leading to a considerable reduction in the consumption of PRI goods; yet, 
the increased consumption of the PPQP goods is not enough to compensate the reduction 
in welfare due to the reduced consumption of the PRI goods. 
When the provision of education and health is financed with a national tax, 
welfare losses in the Pacific region increase as the percentage of the cost of provision 
paid by consumers reduces. Welfare gains in the A&O region become welfare losses as 
                                                 
15 Regional equivalent variations were calculated as the arithmetic sum of individual equivalent variations 
summed across consumer groups. The aggregate welfare change was calculated using an arithmetic sum of 
regional equivalent variations. Problems associated to this procedure are discussed in Boadway (1974) and 
Boadway and Bruce (1984). 
16 Welfare gains are similar when 25% of the revenues raised by the national tax are transferred to the 
Pacific region, 25% to the Atlantic region, 10% to the Andean region, and 40% to the A&O region.  
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the percentage paid by consumers reduces; these losses are generated by a reduction in 
disposable income, because of higher taxes, since they are contributing to finance the 
poorest consumer in the Pacific and Atlantic regions. In the Andean region, welfare 
gains increase as the percentage paid by consumers increase; this is the result of 
increased aggregate consumption caused by the increase in disposable income resulting 
from lower taxes. 
It is interesting to notice that when the provision is financed with either regional 
taxes or a combination of national and regional taxes, all regions are better off as a result 
of the decentralised provision of health and education. Further, welfare gains are larger 
than when the provision is financed with a national tax alone.  
The magnitude of the welfare gains from decentralised provision is substantial, 
especially when compared to those resulting from the tax reforms carried out between 
1990 and 1992, which have been estimated to account for only 0.2% of GDP (see Lora 
and Herrera, 1994). These results suggest that regional differences are very important, 
not only the number of regions, but also the preferences for the goods to be publicly 
provided. The more different the preferences among regions, the better chance for 
considerable welfare gains. 
The results of the model are dependent on the values selected for the elasticities 
of substitution. Sensitivity analysis is performed around the values chosen (although 
these results are not reported here). In particular, the elasticity of substitution in 
consumption between PRI and PPQP goods was varied from 0.5 to 1.5. This elasticity is 
very important in our model since consumption effects, determine the welfare effects of 
any policy change. We conclude that the results are robust to the elasticity choice, in the 
sense that the main predictions of the model do not change. Independently of the 
financing alternative the decentralised provision of PPQP goods generates welfare gains, 
except when the provision is financed by a national tax and consumers pay 0% of the 
cost of provision of the goods. However, the magnitude of the welfare gains is sensitive 
to the value of the elasticity chosen; in particular, the larger the elasticity of substitution 
the smaller the welfare gains. This means that as the goods become more substitutes in 
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consumption there is less room for welfare gains as a result of increased consumption of 
the goods. 
In a second set of simulations, the elasticity of factor substitution in value added 
of the PRI goods was varied from 0.5 to 1.5. The results of the model are robust to the 
value of the elasticities chosen with aggregate welfare gains accounting for 
approximately 2.3% of GDP, as in the central case specification when the provision is 
financed by either regional taxes or a combination of national and regional taxes. 
  
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has presented numerical results on the welfare effects of the decentralised 
provision of health and education using a multiregional CGE model for Colombia. Two 
provision scenarios were compared: one in which goods and services are supplied 
according to national preferences, as opposed to one where goods and services are 
delivered following regional preferences. When the provision is carried out nationally, 
consumers groups across the country are provided with uniform quantities of the goods, 
and these are determined by the median voter of the country. When the provision is 
carried out regionally, uniform quantities of the goods are provided for all consumer 
groups in each region, and these quantities are determined by the corresponding regional 
median voter. In the model, consumers pay a fraction of the cost of the PPQP goods, and 
the government finances the remaining part using a national income tax, regional income 
taxes, or a combination of the two. 
The results show that the decentralised provision of education and health 
improves the welfare of the Colombian population as a whole (except in the case when 
the provision is free of charge). It is worth pointing out that not all regions benefit when 
the provision is financed by a national tax; the Andean and the A&O regions subsidise 
the provision of the Pacific and Atlantic regions. When the provision is financed by 
regional taxes or a combination of national and regional taxes, all regions benefit from 
decentralised provision. 
The main conclusion that arises from this modelling exercise, is that the society 
as a whole is better off when the provision of health and education is carried out  
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regionally as opposed to centrally: with regional provision, each consumer group is 
allocated amounts of the goods that are closer to its preferences. More importantly, these 
welfare gains vary between 1.3% and 2.3% of GDP, a substantial magnitude especially 
when compared with the estimated efficiency gains associated to the tax reforms of the 
early nineties. When the country was divided into three and five regions, the welfare 
gains of decentralisation vary between 1.4% and 2.3% of GDP and between 0.5% and 
1.4% of GDP, respectively. This result suggests that regional differences are very 
important, not only the number of regions, but also the preferences for the goods to be 
publicly provided. The more different the preferences among regions, the better chance 
for considerable welfare gains. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that from the policy point of view, 
decentralisation properly implemented can provide important economic and political 
benefits to regions, as local governments deliver services more efficiently and are 
accountable for public spending. Decentralisation not only involves the allocation of 
expenditure responsibility and/or more fiscal powers to sub-national levels of 
government. It also requires the provision of the necessary resources and the 
development of adequate institutional support and public expenditure management 
structures, if the results are to be socially and economically beneficial. The question is 
then, as McLure (1995) puts it, how to do it well, since decentralisation badly done can 
reduce welfare, increase income disparities among regions, and aggravate fiscal 
problems and corruption, among others.  
  20
 
Table 1: Subsidies when consumers pay 50% of the cost of provision 
(Col $ billions) 
 
 




















        
Pacific        
     Consumer 1  14.3  7.7  7.9  18.4  8.8 9.1 
     Consumer 2  7.2  -2.1  -1.5  0.8  -2.4 -1.9 
     Consumer 3  4.6  -5.6  -4.9  -5.5  -6.4 -5.7 
        
Atlantic        
     Consumer 1  12.8  7.3  7.5  13.2  7.3 7.5 
     Consumer 2  5.8  -2.5  -1.9  -4.4  -2.5 -1.9 
     Consumer 3  4.2  -4.8  -4.1  -8.5  -4.8 -4.1 
        
Andean        
     Consumer 1  -5.0  7.9  6.9  56.9  46.9 45.9 
     Consumer 2  -35.4  -2.0  -4.1  -17.4  -11.7 -13.9 
     Consumer 3  -47.4  -5.9  -8.5  -47.1  -35.2 -37.8 
        
A&O        
     Consumer 1  15.1  6.5  7.0  3.2  2.2 2.8 
     Consumer 2  11.9  -3.3  -2.2  -4.8  -1.1 -0.0 
     Consumer 3  11.9  -3.2  -2.1  -4.8  -1.1 -0.0 
        
 
Note: The subsidy is calculated as the cost of provision of the PPQP goods, minus the value paid 
by the consumer and the income tax.  
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  Percentage of the cost of provision paid by consumers 
 80% 50% 30% 0% 
  EV %GDP EV %GDP  EV %GDP EV %GDP 
          
1. National 
tax 
        
Pacific    -33.5 -0.1% -50.6 -0.2%  -61.9 -0.2% -292.0 -1.0% 
Atlantic  78.9 0.3% 38.8 0.1%  -2.5  -0.0% 317.7 1.0% 
Andean  540.6 1.8% 529.0 1.7% 466.9 1.5% -884.6  -2.9% 
A&O  49.1 0.2% 15.8 0.1% -12.5  -0.0% 135.1 0.4% 
Total  635.1 2.1% 533.0 1.8% 390.0 1.3% -723.8  -2.4% 
          
2. Regional 
taxes 
        
Pacific    1.4 0.0% 2.1 0.0%  2.6 0.0% 3.3 0.0% 
Atlantic  0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0%  0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 
Andean  612.4 2.0% 633.9 2.1% 647.3 2.1% 666.3 2.2% 
A&O  28.4 0.1% 24.9 0.1%  22.8 0.1% 19.9 0.1% 
Total  642.2 2.1% 660.9 2.2% 672.7 2.2% 689.5 2.3% 
          
3. Regional taxes and a 0.05% national tax        
Pacific  1.5 0.0% 2.2 0.0%  2.6 0.0% 3.3 0.0% 
Atlantic  195.6 0.6% 199.3 0.7% 400.7 1.3% 593.0 2.0% 
Andean  441.9 1.5% 444.9 1.5% 249.9 0.8% 87.3 0.3% 
A&O  3.2 0.0% 14.5 0.0%  19.2 0.1% 5.6 0.0% 
Total  642.2 2.1% 660.9 2.2% 672.4 2.2% 689.2 2.3% 
 
    Notes: Totals may not add up because of rounding. EV denotes equivalent variation. GDP 
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Appendix 1: Model equations and notation 
 
Production side of the model 
•  Value-added functions  
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PPQP j j L VA =    [A.2] 
Demand side of the model 
•  Utility function 
1.  Median voter 
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α + α = ∑  [A.3] 
2.  Other consumers 
()() ()()
) 1 /(
























h Q X U
− µ µ







α + α = ∑ , h ≠ M  [A.4] 
 
Constraints 
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1.  Median voter 
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M =  if  a national tax is used to finance the provision, where   
∑

















































Notice that in the expressions for t and t
r the summations are over all consumer groups 
including the median voter.  
 
2.  Other consumers 
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h t I T =  depending on the financing alternative. 
 




j , h Q Q =    [A.7] 
•  Central government budget constraint (IG=EG) 
∑∑ ∑∑ + = + +
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Zero profit conditions 
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Market clearing conditions 















j    [A.13] 
•  Labour market  
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•  Capital market 
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Equations for price relationships 
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List of variables 
r
PRIi VA  Value added PRI good i region r.  
r
PPQPj VA Value added PPQP good j region r.  
r
PRIi L   Labour input PRI good i region r. 
r
PPQPj L  Labour input PPQP good j region r. 
r
PRIi K   Capital input PRI good i region r. 
r
PPQPj K  Capital input PPQP good j region r. 
r
h U   Utility consumer group h region r. 
r
i , h X   Demand PRI good  i consumer group h region r. 
r
j , h Q   Demand PPQP good j consumer group h region r. 
r
h I   Income consumer group h region r. 
r
h E   Expenditure consumer group h region r 
r
L P   Selling price labour input region r. 
K P    Selling price of capital.  
i PRI P    Price paid by consumers for PRI good i.  
r





  Price paid by consumers for PPQP good j region r.  
r
h T   Income tax paid by consumer group h in region r. 
t  National income tax rate. 
t
r  Regional income tax rates. 
TR
r   Central government transfers regional government r. 
 
List of parameters 
γ i
r   Scale parameter value added function, PRI good i region r. 
δi
r   Share parameter value added function, PRI good i region r. 
σi
r    Elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, PRI good i region r. 
r
j υ    Elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, PPQP good j region r. 
r
i , h α   Share parameters utility function, PRI good i region r. 
r
j , h α    Share parameters utility function, PPQP good j region r. 
r
h µ    Elasticity of substitution in consumption consumer group h region r. 
r
h L   Endowment of labour consumer group h region r. 
r
h K   Endowment of capital consumer group h region r. 
r
j , h Q   Government provision of PPQP good j to consumer group h region r. 
φ
r  Percentage of the cost of provision of the PPQP goods paid by consumers.  
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Appendix 2: Colombian regional data set 
 
The resulting four-region data set is presented in the following table. It presents 
production and demands by commodity along with consumers and government(s) 
income and expenditure accounts. On the production side, labour and capital are used to 
produce the PRI goods in each region; as to the PPQP goods, labour is the only factor 
that enters in their production. 
On the demand side, consumers demand both types of goods, and it is initially 
assumed that consumers pay the full cost of the goods provided by the government. The 
consumers income and expenditure accounts show that income generates from factor 
ownership, that is consumers own both factors of production, while expenditure 
corresponds to final demand. Lastly, government income is given by the revenues 
generated by the provision of the PPQP goods and tax collections (although initially it is 
assumed that there are no taxes); government expenditure is in turn given by the cost of 





Table A2.1: Colombian regional data set 
 (Col$ billion) 
 
Production side: Primary inputs 
  Pacific region  Atlantic region  Andean region  A & O region  Total 
  L K  VA  L K  VA  L K  VA  L K  VA  VA 
Primary  goods  390 587 977 508  1,030  1,537  1,252  2,290  3,542 289 971 1,260  7,316 
Manufactures  398 451 850 319 361 679  1,589  1,800  3,388  20  23 43  4,960 
Services  1,170 1,426 2,596 1,014 1,243 2,257 5,314 6,204  11,519  344  411 755  17,126 
Education                                 
Pacific  region 17 0  17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  17 
Atlantic  region 0 0 0  15 0  15 0 0 0 0 0 0  15 
Andean  region  0 0 0 0 0 0  89 0  89 0 0 0  89 
A  &  O  region  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 5 
Health                                 
Pacific  region  102 0  102 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  102 
Atlantic  region 0 0 0  90 0  90 0 0 0 0 0 0  90 
Andean  region  0 0 0 0 0 0  527 0  527 0 0 0  527 
A  &  O  region  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  32 0 32  32 
                                  
Total  2,077 2,464 4,542 1,945 2,633 4,578 8,772  10,294  19,065  690 1,405 2,095  30,280 
 




Table A2.1 (Continued): Colombian regional data set 
 (Col$ billion) 
 
Demand side: Final demands 
  Pacific region  Atlantic region  Andean region  A & O region  Total 
  Cons.1   Cons.2  Cons.3  Cons.1   Cons.2  Cons.3 Cons.1   Cons.2  Cons.3 Cons.1   Cons.2 Cons.3   
Primary  goods  234 420 323 368 661 508 849 1,523  1,170 303 555 402  7,316 
Manufactures  201 340 309 161 271 247 801 1,354  1,234 10  18 15  4,960 
Services  346 911  1,339 300 792  1,164 1,533 4,044  5,941 102 253 400  17,126 
Education                          
Pacific  region  2 6 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  17 
Atlantic  region 0 0 0 2 5 8 0 0 0 0 0 0  15 
Andean  region  0 0 0 0 0 0 12 30  47 0 0 0  89 
A  &  O  region  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 5 
Health                          
Pacific  region 14  34  54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  102 
Atlantic  region  0  0  0 12 30 48 0 0  0 0  0 0 90 
Andean  region  0 0 0 0 0 0 72 175  280 0 0 0  527 
A  &  O  region  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5  11 16  32 
                            







Table A2.1 (Continued): Colombian regional data set 
(Col$ billion) 
 
Consumers income and expenditure accounts 
  Pacific region  Atlantic region  Andean region  A & O region  Total 
  Cons.1    Cons.2 Cons.3 Cons.1    Cons.2 Cons.3 Cons.1    Cons.2 Cons.3 Cons.1 Cons.2 Cons.3   
Labour  income  364 782 931 358 748 839 1,503 3,279  3,990 138 276 275  13,483 
Capital  income  432  928 1,104  485 1,012 1,136 1,764 3,848 4,682  282  563 561  16,796 
Total  income  797 1,711 2,034  844 1,760 1,975 3,266 7,126 8,672  420  840 836  30,280 
                            
Final  demand  797 1,711 2,034  844 1,760 1,975 3,266 7,126 8,672  420  840 836  30,280 
Taxes  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 




Government income and expenditure accounts 
Provision Education  127 
Provision Health  751 
Tax collections  0 
Total income  878 
  
Cost provision Education  127 
Cost provision Health  751 
Total expenditure  878 
 
 
Source: Totals may not add up due to rounding. DANE (1995b) and author's calculations.  
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Appendix 3 
Quantities of education and health provided by 
the central and regional governments as determined by the median voter 
 




The cost of 
Provision paid 
by consumers (PP): 
Education Health 
 
1. Financed with a national tax 
    
PP = 80%  5.4  31.8 
PP = 50%  5.9  35.2 
PP = 30%  6.4  37.9 
PP = 0%  7.2  42.8 
    
2. Financed with regional taxes 
    
PP = 80%  4.9  29.0 
PP = 50%  4.7  27.7 
PP = 30%  4.6  27.0 
PP = 0%  4.4  25.9 
    
3. Financed with regional taxes and a 0.05% national tax 
    
PP = 80%  4.9  29.0 
PP = 50%  4.7  27.7 
PP = 30%  4.5  27.0 




Table A.3.1 (Continued): Regional provision 
(billion units) 
 
Percentage of  Region 1  Region 2  Region 3  Region 4 
the cost of 
provision paid 
by consumers: 
Educ. Health Educ. Health Educ. Health Educ. Health 
          
1. Financed with a national tax 
          
PP =  80%  6.9 40.6 6.0 35.6  31.4  186.0  2.2 12.9 
PP = 50%  9.8  57.6  8.6  50.4  34.6  204.9  3.3  19.3 
PP  =  30%  13.7 80.1 11.9 69.8 37.2  219.8 5.0  29.1 
PP  =  0%  33.8 196.5 28.8 168.0 41.8 246.8 21.4 124.6 
          
2. Financed with regional taxes 
          
PP =  80%  5.6 33.2 4.9 29.0  28.9  171.1  1.7 10.2 
PP = 50%  5.4  32.0  4.7  27.7  27.9  165.2  1.6  9.6 
PP = 30%  5.3  31.2  4.6  27.0  27.3  161.5  1.6  9.3 
PP = 0%  5.1  30.1  4.4  25.9  26.4  156.3  1.5  8.8 
          
3. Financed with regional taxes and a 0.05% national tax 
          
PP =  80%  5.6 33.2 4.9 29.0  28.9  171.0  1.7 10.2 
PP = 50%  5.4  31.9  4.7  27.7  27.9  165.1  1.6  9.6 
PP = 30%  5.3  31.2  4.5  27.0  27.2  161.5  1.6  9.3 
PP = 0%  5.1  30.1  4.4  25.9  26.4  156.2  1.5  8.8 
 
  Note: In some cases the provision levels seem identical, but this is due to rounding.  